Transportation utility fees are a financing mechanism for transportation that treats the network as a utility and bills properties in proportion to their use, rather than their value as with the property tax. This connects the costs of maintaining the infrastructure more directly to the benefits received from mobility and access to the system. The fees are based on trips generated and vary with land use. This paper evaluates the fees as an alternative funding source in terms of economic, equity and administrative effects. The experiences of cities currently using utility fees for transportation are discussed. Calculations are included to determine the fee levels necessary for transportation maintenance budget needs in three sample cities and a county in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
Introduction
As local shares of state gasoline taxes decrease and property tax increases remain unpopular, an alternative funding mechanism that has generated increased interest is the transportation utility fee. The distribution of property taxes is based on property value, which is not always a good indication of the burden a property places on the transportation system. Because fuel efficiency of motor vehicles varies widely, the correlation between fuel consumption and road use is also not direct. Transportation utility fees are assessed to properties based on the amount of trips they generate, providing a more direct connection between demand for transportation facilities and the costs of constructing and maintaining them. This paper will discuss the development of the fees and evaluate their viability as an alternative funding source. The concept and rationale for the fees will be explained, along with the experiences of several locations in the United States that have enacted them. Criteria for evaluation will follow, including the potential and observed effects of the fees on economic efficiency and equity, as well as political and administrative feasibility issues the fees present. An analysis was conducted to determine the necessary fee level to fund budgeted transportation needs in three sample cities and a county in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area. A description of the data, the methodology used and discussion of the results are presented.
Concept and Rationale
The reasoning behind transportation utility fees holds that the transportation system functions as a public utility comparable to municipal water and sewer systems. Those utilities are funded by charging users based on how much they use the system, and transportation funding can be approached in a similar way. Properties that cause more traffic by the nature of their use are responsible for a greater portion of the wear and tear on transportation infrastructure, and might reasonably be expected to make a larger contribution toward maintenance expenses. The fees can be used to finance construction or maintenance projects for any transportation mode, but are most commonly applied to roads and used to fund preventive maintenance of existing facilities rather than capital projects.
In many instances, the establishment of the fee was motivated by a revenue shortfall and a backlog of road maintenance projects. As a fee rather than a tax, it can be established by city government without a public referendum. The visible connection between the fee and its purpose can also make it more palatable to the public and easier to levy than a new tax. However, to be considered a fee and not a tax, a firm relationship between the costs and benefits must be established. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts established three standards that distinguish fees from taxes: They are assessed in exchange for a particular benefit, they are avoidable by opting not to use the service, and they do not exist to raise revenue but to compensate the government for the costs of providing the service (Emerson College v. City of Boston, 1984) . Variation of these standards by state has led to a checkered history for the fees in the courts, and whether they are upheld as costs paid for services rendered or struck down as illegal taxes can become a semantic argument.
Extent of Use
Transportation utility fees have been used in several states since the first ordinance was enacted in Fort Collins, Colorado in 1984. They have become most popular in Oregon, where the city of La Grande was the first to adopt in 1985. The extent of adoption depends on the legality of the fees, which varies by state and by the wording of the particular fee in question. The Fort Collins fee was challenged by residents and discontinued by the city. The fee in Pocatello, Idaho met a similar fate in 1986, but litigation continued in both cases until reaching the state supreme courts. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled the Pocatello fee to be unconstitutional (Brewster v. Pocatello, 1988) , while the Colorado Supreme Court ruled the Fort Collins fee to be valid with the removal of a clause directing excess collections into the general fund (Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 1990) . The fee in Oregon was never challenged, encouraging more city governments in that state to consider it a viable option. The concept then spread to Texas, where Beaumont introduced a fee that has gone unchallenged, and to Florida, where the Port Orange fee drew opposition and was overturned (Florida v. City of Port Orange, 1994) . These and other locations using the fees are displayed in Table 1 .
The most common basis for the fee is an estimated number of trip ends attributable to each property type using the procedures found in the Trip Generation manual published by the Institute of Transportation Engineers (2003) . Other applications include flat or per-unit fees that vary only by property type, and fees based on land area, floor area or frontage. All of these are estimates, rather than measurements of exact usage for individual properties as with water or sewer service, so the connection between cost and service is less solid than for other utilities. The Trip Generation methods are more likely to withstand legal scrutiny than estimates based on lot size, but as Shoup (2003) discusses, they are hardly ideal. They are meant to apply nationally, but some of the rates given are based on very small sample sizes and show little correlation. If they are used as the basis for utility fees, the accuracy of the estimated rates might be improved by adjusting based on local traffic counts.
Assessment Criteria
The proposed fees should be evaluated per se, and also against the existing mechanism in the jurisdiction, which is usually the property tax. Criteria to consider include economic efficiency, equity of distribution, and political, administrative and financial feasibility. All are important, but revenue levels and administration issues might be given more weight if fee collection and expenditure for transportation is to be completely separated from general revenue. Whom to charge can be difficult to determine for non-owner-occupied properties. The property tax contributions of absentee landlords would be lost, but charging the fee to the operator of a business would create a closer connection to trip generation than charging the landowner. However, this could complicate administration if tenant information is less complete and up-to-date than ownership data. A larger portion of the cost of transportation might be paid by nonresidents with a utility fee than with a tax, as the commercial share would increase and would likely be passed on to customers.
If the fee were based on metered usage as with other utilities, it might influence user behavior, but this is less likely when the basis is predicted instead of actual use and billing is not immediate.
It could thus be called non-distortionary, since residents could not decrease their bills by making fewer trips. This characteristic has potential to create legal issues if the definition of a fee in the state in question requires that it be avoidable by nonusers.
Equity
A utility fee based on trip generation would adhere to the benefit principle of taxation perfectly, if accurate trip generation calculations were possible. Even using estimates, the costs of road maintenance billed as a utility fee coincide much more closely with road use than does the property tax. However, the correlation between a property's transportation utility bill and the owner's ability to pay would be less than the property tax. The amount of trips generated by residences in lower-income neighborhoods is the same as in more affluent areas, and the financial condition of a business may not be reflected by the number of customers or deliveries it attracts. The ability-topay criterion is less applicable to a fee than a tax, because it pays for the cost of services used by a particular property rather than by the community. Because the purpose of a fee is to cover specific costs rather than to raise general revenue, the benefit principle should be given greater weight.
The fairness of a specific fee is also affected by its basis. For example, a fee based on land area would place undue burden on parks and other large parcels that are not used intensively. A fee based on frontage would do likewise to a lesser extent. The inclusion of parcels exempt from property taxation would mean that residential properties would contribute a lesser proportion of the total expense. An equity issue that arises from the Trip Generation procedures is that the number of units in a multi-family residential development is not the best proxy for the number of residents or, by extension, the number of trips. A solution proposed by Carlson et al. (2007) is to apportion the residential share by number of bedrooms rather than by number of units. Courts have held that exact calculations are not required as long as the fee schedule is not arbitrary (Ewing, 1993) . Because trip generation figures are estimates rather than observations, the same methodology should be used for all types of property to achieve the same degree of accuracy.
Several other measures have been taken in various cities to make the fees more acceptable to certain types of properties. One common consideration is to count "pass-by" trips with lesser weight for businesses such as gas stations and convenience stores that attract traffic already making trips between two other destinations. With no adjustment, such trips cause an unfairly high charge since they were not really generated by the business. A similar adjustment can be made for mixeduse developments that internalize some trips. Another option is to assess truck trips at a higher rate than car trips, since heavier vehicles cause more damage to roads. Some examples of discounts allowed in jurisdictions with existing fees are given in Table 2 . Several cities also exempt vacant 
Feasibility
As with any adjustment to existing finance mechanisms, winners and losers would be created. This effect has potential to create greater obstacles to transportation utility fees because the increased bills would fall on commercial interests, which are generally fewer in number but more prominent politically than homeowners. Since the first application in most states has been contested, local officials enacting a utility fee for transportation should be prepared to defend it against a legal challenge. The most important characteristic a fee must contain to be upheld is a direct and apparent connection of the costs and benefits associated with each affected property.
An adequate level of revenue would be determined by calculations based on the cost of necessary maintenance or on the existing share of property tax devoted to transportation uses. Since utility fees are best suited for funding continued maintenance of existing facilities, another funding source would be necessary for capital projects. It may be politically necessary to limit the fee to funding only a portion of maintenance expenses, as was the case in Clackamas County, Oregon (Springer and Ghilarducci, 2004) . Additional financing to cover the remaining costs would then be needed from other sources.
The administrative workload would be increased compared to the status quo, because the fee would not replace existing property tax, which would still be needed to fund other city expenses.
City officials would need to become familiar with trip generation calculation methods and ensure land use classifications are updated frequently. Addressing equity concerns due to estimation procedures by increasing the number of property categories would also require more administrative effort.
Analysis
Introducing a transportation utility fee to fund projects that would otherwise be paid for out of the general fund through property taxes would change the proportional contribution of each land use.
This analysis determines fees for each type of property based on trip generation using the cities The QCEW data also included categorized employments, but did not report data that would disclose information about a specific employer because of a low number of businesses in a category. For Hennepin County, the fee was estimated using the amount budgeted in 2009 for the transportation department. Line items included were administration, planning, design, construction, traffic and operations. Capital expenditures for new construction projects are budgeted separately and were not included. If the county were to adopt a utility fee in addition to the city fees, it would replace the portion of county property taxes directed toward transportation, and properties in the sample cities would be assessed both fees.
Methodology
The number of trips generated on a weekday by each single-family parcel, each unit in a multifamily complex, each business or institution and each acre of parkland were computed for each city and for the county. The transportation cost total from the municipal budget was then allocated by trip. The results display the fee charged to each property type that would be sufficient to cover the reported transportation expenses.
The distribution of residential properties was calculated by adding together all parcels in singlefamily residential areas in each municipality using GIS and dividing the total by the number of households in the city given by the QCEW data. The generalized land use file from MetroGIS distinguishes single-family attached construction from single-family detached houses. This analysis assumes that typical household behavior is similar in both types of developments, and this takes precedence over the type of physical construction. Therefore both areas were included as singlefamily developments for the purpose of assigning trips. The number of units in multi-family buildings was determined by subtracting the number of single-family homes from the total. The trip generation rate applied to multi-family units was the average of the reported rates for apartments and condominiums.
Distributing trips among the various commercial uses involved a more complicated process.
The files created by Horning, El-Geneidy and Krizek (2008) included three levels of categorization based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). At the finest granularity, NAICS codes are six-digit identifiers of the specific nature of businesses. The data for the sevencounty metropolitan area included 1027 six-digit categories. The businesses were reclassified into 67 specific destination codes, and then into 17 more general categories. In Trip Generation, busi-ness and institutional properties are grouped into 98 categories, several of which do not correlate closely with either the destination codes or the larger categories. For this analysis, the 17 most general categories of nonresidential properties from Horning, El-Geneidy and Krizek (2008) were used, and trip generation rates per employee were determined from the reported information for the most similar category or categories in Trip Generation.
The property categories and trip generation rates used in the analysis are presented in Table 3 .
The "Other" category consists mostly of manufacturing and construction jobs, but also includes agriculture and mining. Some categories, such as food and entertainment, encompassed uses with wide varieties of trip generation rates. For those with multiple available rates in Trip Generation that could be considered representative, an average rate was calculated. The level of aggregation chosen meant that additional considerations, such as a fee reduction for pass-by trips, could not be included reliably, since some categories include both convenience businesses that would merit such a reduction and destination businesses that would not. Each unit of each use was counted in mixed-use development areas, but no reduction was made to account for internalized trips.
Properties dedicated to educational, institutional, civic and religious uses were included in the Dun & Bradstreet data. Parks, however, were not included and were accounted for separately, though they generate few trips compared to the total. The acreage of parkland in each city was calculated from the land use data, and the trip generation rate per acre for city parks was applied.
If parks are owned by the municipality, the cost derived from the trips they generate could be apportioned among other land uses or transferred from funds collected for the parks budget from other sources.
The proportion of trips in each city generated by each use was then calculated. This proportion of the total transportation cost was allocated to each land use type, and then divided by the number of units to calculate the residential fee and by the number of employees in each category to determine the nonresidential fee. Fees were calculated under two scenarios. Fee 1 was determined assuming a complete reallocation of transportation funding obligation based on trips generated. Fee 2 retained the general land use breakdown of the property tax, but reallocated the bills of each category of residential and commercial development. All calculations were performed using annual data, but since a utility fee would likely be charged monthly, a monthly fee level is reported as well.
The total property tax bill for each parcel was included in the parcel data set. The metadata file provided does not explain which jurisdictions' taxes are included, and it is likely that taxes levied by other bodies such as the county and the school districts are contained in the reported tax.
This does not affect the proportional contributions calculated for each property type because all jurisdictions tax the same value, and only the relative tax share paid by each category of property was of interest for this analysis. This was used to determine an annual share of property tax per employee or per unit allocated to transportation for comparison. 
Results
The results of the calculations are presented in the charts below. The comparison between the fees calculated by both methods and the share of transportation cost paid via property tax is displayed in Figure 1 for Minneapolis, Figure 2 for Richfield, Figure 3 for Bloomington and Figure 4 for Hennepin County. If Fee 1 were enacted, completely redistributing transportation cost, most commercial properties would pay more and all residential properties would pay less. Under Fee 2, redistributing costs among the categories within each land use type, similar effects are evident to a lesser degree. The multi-family contribution would increase relative to the single-family share, and offices would pay less compared to retail establishments. The difference in scale between the three cities is determined by the total transportation funding need, in proportion to total property value in the city for the property tax and to the total number of trips generated in the city for the utility fees.
The monthly utility fees proposed under each scenario for residential properties are presented in Table 4 for each city. As a point of comparison, the residential fees calculated for the cities studied by the Transportation Policy Institute (2004) ranged from $0.92 to $2.33 for single-family homes and from $0.55 to $1.40 for apartments. The difference in fee levels from city to city can be attributed to variation in the amount and distribution of development and in the funding needs.
No data were available for comparison to per-employee rates, as most jurisdictions using the fees have based them on developed floor area for nonresidential properties.
Calculations were also made in an attempt to quantify the equity effects on residential property by value. Single-family residential properties were divided into four groups by estimated total value. The average annual cost paid by a household in each group toward transportation was determined for each of the three cities using current property taxes. This amount was compared to the fee per unit, which varies only by city irrespective of property value. Multi-family housing units
were not included because the transportation cost per unit is less certain. This is partly because of data limitations, and partly because the incidence of tax on rental property is not clear.
The results are shown in Table 5 . The magnitude of the regressive effect of the fees can be seen, as the owners of lower-valued properties would see their bills increase, and the owners of more valuable property would contribute less. Under Fee 1, all residential properties would pay less, with the burden being shifted onto commercial property. Higher property values mean higher bills currently, so these households would see a larger decrease with the fee. The regressive effect is more apparent with Fee 2 because changes in all residential bills must add to zero, though the overall shift is less drastic. Either scenario gives less weight to property owners' ability to pay than the property tax, in exchange for greater correlation with the amount of use of the network.
However, even property value is not a great indicator of the ability of the owner to pay, since valuable land does not necessarily correlate with high liquid wealth.
The connection between the demand placed on transportation facilities and the share of the cost charged to a property for maintenance can be strengthened further by accounting for the length of the trips each type of property generates. The Metropolitan Council in the Twin Cities conducted a travel behavior inventory that included information about the average distances traveled for different types of trips (Metropolitan Council, 2003) . The categories used in the inventory are more general than those used in this analysis, and included separate average lengths for work, shopping, school and other trips. The nonresidential trip generation figures were then weighted by length to calculate adjusted fee levels. The results are shown as a comparison of shares of nonresidential trip ends in Table 6 .
This calculation was based on the reported lengths for home-based trips. Non-home-based lengths were included in the inventory, but were only divided into work and non-work trips, categories not specific enough to be of use in this analysis. The multiple levels of aggregation mean the estimate for the trip length adjustment is less certain than the rest of the analysis results. Assumptions must be made to assign the land use categories to work, shopping or other trips, and the distribution between these is undetermined. If a municipality were to include such a length adjustment in its fee ordinance, more exact figures on the proportion of trips that are customers versus employees would likely be needed.
Conclusion
Transportation utility fees connect the proportion of maintenance cost paid by a property with the amount of relative use, providing improvements in equity and economic efficiency over the property tax. However, the legality of the fees varies from state to state, and there is a risk that a fee will be invalidated as an unauthorized tax. Fee ordinances that have been upheld have generally limited the proceeds to transportation purposes only, and have tended to favor maintenance applications over new construction, meaning funding from other sources would still be necessary for large capital projects.
The fees would change the proportion of transportation costs borne by each type of property compared to conventional property tax funding. Residential property owners would pay less, and commercial property owners would generally pay more. Lower-valued residential properties would see a larger cost increase than more valuable property. Reducing the change between a proposed fee and the amount a property owner currently pays in property tax toward transportation may improve the political viability of the fee system. One way to accomplish this would be to leave the general distribution of costs unchanged, and reallocate based on trip generation only among 1.000
1.000
1.000 specific categories of property within the same land use. Further adjustment based on trip length may also help to address equity concerns the fees present.
When a utility fee is designed, a balance must be found between efficiency, equity and administrative concerns. The most fair system in terms of billing based on use would mean placing traffic counters at each property to obtain accurate trip generation rates. This would be prohibitively expensive, and even then the potential for evasion would remain. More categories of land uses would enable rate estimates to be adjusted at a finer level, improving equity while avoiding the cost of metering traffic. An optimal level of aggregation would weigh the need for accurate estimates and for minimizing the potential for legal challenges against the additional administrative effort that a more detailed procedure would require.
